As President Donald Trump and billionaire Elon Musk work to overhaul the federal government, they’re forcing out thousands of workers with insider knowledge and connections who now need a job.
For Russia, China and other adversaries, the upheaval in Washington as Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency guts government agencies presents an unprecedented opportunity to recruit informants, national security and intelligence experts say.
Every former federal worker with knowledge of or access to sensitive information or systems could be a target. When thousands of them leave their jobs at the same time, that creates a lot of targets, as well as a counterespionage challenge for the United States.
“This information is highly valuable, and it shouldn’t be surprising that Russia and China and other organizations — criminal syndicates for instance — would be aggressively recruiting government employees,” said Theresa Payton, a former White House chief information officer under President George W. Bush, who now runs her own cybersecurity firm.
Many agencies oversee crucial data
Each year an average of more than 100,000 federal workers leave their jobs. Some retire; others move to the private sector. This year, in three months, the number is already many times higher.
It’s not just intelligence officers who present potential security risks. Many departments and agencies oversee vast amounts of data that include personal information on Americans as well as sensitive information about national security and government operations. Exiting employees could also give away helpful security secrets that would allow someone to penetrate government databases or physical offices.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, for instance, maintains information on trade negotiations that could help an adversary undercut the United States. Federal records house data on clandestine intelligence operations and agents. Pentagon databases contain reams of sensitive information on U.S. Military capabilities. The Department of Energy oversees many of the nation’s most closely guarded nuclear secrets.
“This happens even in good times — someone in the intelligence community who for personal financial or other reasons walks into an embassy to sell America out — but DOGE is taking it to a whole new level,” said John Schindler, a former counterintelligence official.
“Someone is going to go rogue,” he said. “It’s just a question of how bad it will be.”
Only a tiny fraction of the many millions of Americans who have worked for the federal government have ever been accused of espionage. The overwhelming number are conscientious patriots who would never sell out their country, Payton said.
Background checks, employee training and exit interviews are all designed to prevent informants or moles — and to remind departing federal employees of their duty to preserve national secrets even after leaving federal service.
Even one person can do serious damage
It takes only one or two misguided or disgruntled workers to cause a national security crisis. Former FBI agent Robert Hanssen and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who both spied for Russia, show just how damaging a single informant can be.
Hanssen divulged sweeping information about American intelligence-gathering, including details that authorities said were partly responsible for the outing of U.S. Informants in Russia who were later executed for working on America’s behalf.
The odds that one angry former employee reaches out to a foreign power go up as many federal employees find themselves without a job, experts said. What’s not in doubt is that foreign adversaries are looking for any former employees they can flip. They’re hunting for that one informant who could deliver a big advantage for their nation.
“It’s a numbers game,” said Schindler.
Frank Montoya Jr., a retired senior FBI official and former top U.S. Government counterintelligence executive, said he was less concerned about well-trained intelligence community employees betraying their oaths and selling out to American adversaries. But he noted the many workers in other realms of government who could be targeted by Russia or China,
“When it comes to the theft of intellectual property, when it comes to the theft of sensitive technology, when it comes to access to power grids or to financial systems, an IRS guy or a Social Service guy who’s really upset about what DOGE is doing, they actually are the bigger risk,” Montoya said.
Once military and intelligence officials were the primary targets of foreign spies looking to turn an informant. But now, thanks to the massive amount of information held at many agencies, and the competitive edge it could give China or Russia, that’s no longer the case.
“We have seen over the last generation, the last 20–25 years, the Chinese and the Russians increasingly have been targeting non-national defense and non-classified information, because it helps them modernize their military, it helps them modernize their infrastructure,” Montoya said.
Online activity makes it easier than it once was
The internet has made it far easier for foreign nations to identify and recruit potential informants.
Once, Soviet intelligence officers had to wait for an embittered agent to make contact, or go through the time-consuming process of identifying which recently separated federal employees could be pliable. Now, all you need is a LinkedIn subscription and you can quickly find former federal officials in search of work.
“You go on LinkedIn, you see someone who was ‘formerly at Department of Defense now looking for work’ and it’s like, ‘Bingo,’” Schindler said.
A foreign spy service or scammer looking to exploit a recently laid-off federal worker could bring in potential recruits by posting a fake job ad online.
One particularly novel concern involves the fear that a foreign agent could set up a fake job interview and hire former federal officials as “consultants” to a fake company. The former federal workers would be paid for their expertise without even knowing they were supplying information to an enemy. Russia has paid unwitting Americans to do its business before.
Payton’s advice for former federal employees looking for work? It’s the same as her guidance for federal counterespionage officials, she said: “Be on high alert.”
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not respond to questions about the risks that a former federal worker or contractor could sell out the country. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard recently announced plans to investigate leaks within the intelligence community, though her announcement was focused not on counterespionage concerns but on employees who pass information to the press or the public.
In a statement, the office said it would investigate any claims that a member of the intelligence community was improperly releasing information.
“There are many patriots in the IC that have reached out to DNI Gabbard and her team directly, explaining that they have raised concerns on these issues in the past but they have been ignored,” the office said. “That will no longer be the case.”
