In early 2022, Russia and China famously declared their friendship had “no limits,” right before Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
TL;DR
- Russia pays significantly higher prices for Chinese sanctioned goods, with costs surging 87% from 2021-2024.
- Ball bearings and tapered roller bearings from China to Russia saw price increases, potentially for armaments.
- Trade sanctions successfully limited Russia's access to critical goods, increasing their cost.
- The Russia-China economic relationship is asymmetric, with China being more important to Russia.
Over three years onward, this connection appears more and more unbalanced, and evidently excludes favorable price reductions, as Moscow depends significantly on Beijing to soften the impact of sanctions imposed by The West.
A recent report from the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies revealed that the average cost Russia incurred for Chinese exports of restricted items surged by 87% from 2021 to 2024. In contrast, for exports originating from different nations, the costs of sanctioned goods experienced a mere 9% increase over the same period.
Experts pointed out ball bearings, a product on the European Union's roster of critical goods. Although the worth of ball-bearing shipments from China to Russia surged by 76% between 2021 and 2024, the volume of these exports decreased by 13%, suggesting a doubling of the per-unit cost.
Regarding tapered roller bearings, the cost per unit almost quadrupled. Both product categories are essential industrial components that could potentially be utilized in Russia's armaments industry.
“Our general results, illustrated here with two simple examples, lead us to conclude that trade sanctions have been successful in their aim of limiting Russia’s access to critical goods,” the Bank of Finland said.
To be clear, China was not the sole nation that managed to extract greater costs from Russia. The analysis indicated that Turkish sales prices for prohibited items to Russia saw an increase of 25%–55% when contrasted with other sales.
Overall, prices of sanctioned products were 40% higher than prices of non-sanctioned products.
A distinct report from Capital Economics indicated that the combined trade volume between Russia and China experienced a 9% decrease over the initial nine months of 2025 when contrasted with the preceding year. This decline follows a period where trade more than doubled between 2020 and 2024.
China now represents 30% of Russia's merchandise shipments abroad and 50% of its inbound goods. Conversely, Russia makes up merely 3% of China's outbound merchandise and 5% of its inbound merchandise.
Chinese companies are apprehensive about possible repercussions from Western penalties against Moscow, yet there's scant indication that China is broadening its supply networks within Russia, and foreign direct investment continues to be restricted.
“Overall, the Russia-China relationship is—and will remain—asymmetric,” Capital Economics said. “China is more important for Russia economically than Russia is for China. And Russia wants and needs more from the relationship than China is willing to provide.”
The reports come amid signs that the Kremlin has proposed business deals with the U.S. As part of talks to the end the Ukraine war and lift sanctions.
Concurrently, Putin’s wartime economy is hitting a wall as manufacturing delays, insufficient staffing, reduced public expenditure, and the absence of Western innovations are progressively creating pressures.
“To produce substantially more equipment or recruit and train far more soldiers, Moscow would have to shift to a more comprehensive war footing by directing all available resources toward military needs, as it did during World War II, or commandeering civilian production lines for military purposes,” Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and former Russian central bank advisor, wrote in Foreign Affairs last month.